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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
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Has Appellant shown any error in the record below? 
Where a prosecutor states he made an independent 
prosecutorial decision to charge a person with a crime, should 
informants and witnesses be sued for unduly influencing the 
prosecutor to file charges, or for providing the prosecutor with 
information. 
Are witnesses involved with criminal complaints immune 
from subsequent civil suits by disgruntled criminal defendants? 
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Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 24, attached as 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, attached as 
Appendix A. 
Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 L.edi2d 96 (1983) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appeal from the grant of Summary Judgment in favor of 
Respondents in tort actions arising out of Respondents' aid to a 
criminal prosecution of the Appellant. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For brevity/ these respondents incorporate by reference 
the Statement of the Case set out in the brief of respondent 
AMICA Insurance Company (hereafter "AMICA"), with the following 
additions. 
Respondents James M. Black, R. LaMar Guiver and Black, 
Nichols & Guiver (hereafter collectively "Black & Guiver") were 
hired by AMICA to investigate possible insurance fraud by 
Schettler. (Record at 418, 421f and 423). Black & Guiver also 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and incorporated the 
arguments of AMICA by reference. (Record at 457). 
Schettler's claims against respondents Black & Guiver 
summarized as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE. Black & Guiver used the criminal process 
against Schettler as complaining witnesses, investigators and 
instigators to alert the County Attorney's office to file a 
criminal information. 
SECOND CAUSE. Black & Guiver somehow assisted or 
influenced AMICA into filing a civil suit against Schettler. 
THIRD CAUSE. Black & Guiver published slanderous or 
defamatory statements by alleging to the County Attorney's office 
and the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office that Schettler may have 
committed a crime. 
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FOURTH CAUSE. Black & Guiver breached a contractual 
relationship between Schettler and AMICA (although Black & Guiver 
were not parties to any contract)• 
FIFTH CAUSE. Not applicable because voluntarily 
dismissed by Schettler. 
SIXTH CAUSE. Black & Guiver negligently inflicted 
emotional distress by cooperating with the County Attorney's 
office against Schettler. 
SEVENTH CAUSE. Black & Guiver negligently caused damage 
to Schettler by acting as a witness for the prosecution. 
(Record at 51 to 5 8). 
At the trial against Carl F. Schettler in the District 
Court both James M. Black and R. LaMar Guiver testified on behalf 
of the State against the defendant, Carl F. Schettler, concerning 
matters which they had learned during their inquiries into the 
insurance claim made by Schettler for the theft of his car. 
(Record at 253. See also State v. Schettler, 5th Circuit Court 
Criminal No. 84FS1510; and State v. Schetler, 3rd District Court 
No. 64372). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For brevity, Black & Guiver adopt the Summary of 
Argument of AMICA with the following addition. The actions 
complained of by Schettler were done in aid of prosecution, and 
as complaining witnesses and witnesses in a case brought by the 
County Attorney's office through their independent prosecutorial 




THIS COURT'S STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW OF 
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS LIMITED 
TO THOSE ERRORS SPECIFICALLY CITED AND 
SUPPORTED IN APPELANT'S BRIEF. 
For brevity Black & Guiver adopt the argument of AMICA 
in its brief. See Point I therein. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO SHOW ERROR IN THE 
RECORD CREATES A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF 
RESPONDENTS AND WAIVES ANY OF THE CLAIMED 
ERRORS. 
For brevity Black & Guiver adopt the argument of AMICA 
in its brief. See Point II therein. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVITS WERE PROPERLY STRICKEN 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 56 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
For brevity Black & Guiver adopt the argument of AMICA 
in its brief. See Point III therein. 
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POINT IV 
AS A MATTER OF LAW NO UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS 
EXERCISED OVER THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
WHICH RESULTED IN THE PROSECUTION OF SCHETTLER 
FOR A CRIME 
The facts alleged in Schettler's Complaint against Black 
& Guiver relate to their providing information or evidence to the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office and/or Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office, or in trying to influence those offices to 
prosecute. (Record at 51 to 58). 
In an affidavit presented to the court, Ernie Jonesf the 
Prosecutor for the Salt Lake County Attorney's office who 
screened the case and who prosecuted the case, said that he made 
an independent prosecutorial decision without any improper 
influence or pressure from Black and/or Guiver and that had he 
had the decision to make all over again, knowing the facts as 
they were, he would still file a criminal complaint and prosecute 
even though Schettler was acquitted at trial. (Record at 715-145 
to 715-148). 
An independent magistrate bound Carl F. Schettler over 
for trial finding probable cause that a crime had been committed 
which probable cause finding verifies the good faith and probable 
cause which Black & Guiver may have had in giving information to 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office and/or the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office. (Record at 715-80). 
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Because independent probable cause was found, and the 
prosecutor, who alone made the decision to prosecute, based his 
decision to prosecute on facts other than any improper influence 
or pressure from Black and Guiver, Schettlerfs allegations have 
no factual basis as a matter of law, and summary judgment was 
appropriate. Nothing to rebut the prosecutor's affidavit or to 
place his statements at issue or to show bad faith of Black & 
Guiver was presented to the trial court. 
POINT V 
PERSONS WHO PARTICIPATE AS WITNESSES AND 
INFORMANTS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL SUIT 
FROM DISGRUNTLED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
In Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 75 L.ed.2d 96, (1983) 
(hereafter Briscoe) , the U.S. Supreme Court considered the issue 
"whether 42 USC §1983 (the Civil Rights Statute) authorizes a 
convicted person to assert a claim for damages against a police 
officer for giving perjured testimony at his criminal trial." 
Id, (L.ed.) at 102. The facts in Briscoe are egregious. 
Therein the plaintiff had actually been convicted, and the 
testimony of the police officer was admittedly perjured. In the 
present case Carl Schettler was acquitted after he was presumed 
innocent at all stages. In addition Third-Party Defendants did 
not perjure themselves. 
In Briscoe, the lower courts, in cases consolidated for 
appeal, had granted motions to dismiss in two unrelated cases. 
In one, a convicted burglar and in the other convicted sexual 
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assaultors sued policemen who had perjured themselves at trial. 
The Seventh Circuit court affirmed the dismissals, finding that 
"all witnesses - police officers as well as lay witnesses - are 
absolutely immune from civil liability based on their testimony 
in judicial proceedings." 663 F.2d 713 (1981). Id. at 103. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court 
and the District Courts. Before reaching the question of whether 
or not police officers have absolute immunity under Section 1983, 
the Supreme Court began with an analysis of the long history of 
absolute immunity of lay witnesses. The court talked of the well 
established principle in English common lawt 
The immunity of parties and witnesses from 
subsequent damages liability for their 
testimony in judicial proceedings was well 
established in English common law. Cutler v. 
Dixon, 4 Co.Rep. 14Bf 76 Eng.Rep. 886 (QB 
1585); (three other citations from the years 
1614 to 1866, omitted). 
Id. at 105. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis of American Law by 
noting that the absolute immunity of witnesses even applied where 
statements of witnesses were false and made maliciously: 
Some American decisions required a showing 
that the witnesses' allegedly defamatory 
statements were relevant to the judicial 
proceeding but once this threshold showing had 
been made the witness had an absolute 
privilege. The plaintiff could not recover 
even if the witness knew the statements were 
false and made them with malice. 
Id, at 105. A footnote to the above quotation cites treatises on 
defamation, libel and slander, and many cases from varying state 
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jurisdictions for support of the statement by the Supreme Court. 
The Court found that the public policy supporting the 
absolute immunity far outweighed any negative consequences: 
In the words of one 19th century court, in 
damages suits against witnesses, 'the claims 
of the individual must yield to the dictates 
of public policyf which requires that the 
paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth 
should be left as free and unobstructed as 
possible.1 Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 
197 (1860). 
Id. at 106. The public policy was based on encouraging witnesses 
to come forward without apprehension of subsequent reprisals in 
the civil courts: 
A witnesses1 apprehension of subsequent 
damages liability might induce two forms of 
self-censorship. First, the witnesses might 
be reluctant to come forward to testify. 
(Citation omitted). And once a witness is on 
the stand his testimony might be distorted by 
the fear of subsequent liability (citation 
omitted). 
* * * 
A witness who knows he might be forced to 
defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to 
pay damages might be inclined to shade his 
testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff, 
to magnify uncertainties and thus to deprive 
the finder of fact of candid, objective, and 
undistorted evidence. See Veeder, Absolute 
Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 
9 Colum.L.Rev. 463, 470 (1909). 
Id. at 106. 
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This court should note that the Supreme Court finds 
odious the mere possibility that a witness may be forced to 
defend a subsequent lawsuit, let alone possibly pay damages. Even 
having to defend may have a chilling effect on the judicial 
process, and should not be allowed, let alone allowing the court 
to proceed to trial where the witness could fear the payment of 
damages. It must be noted that the section of the Supreme Court 
opinion concerning the absolute immunity of lay witnesses is 
replete with footnotes and citations to cases, learned treatises, 
law review articles, etc. all of which support the conclusions 
mentioned above. 
After analyzing the strong public policy and the 
absolute nature of the immunity of witnesses, the Court analyzed 
the immunity of judges and prosecutors, finding that the judges1 
and prosecutors' immunity was similar to, and based upon, the 
same considerations which would require absolute immunity for 
witnesses: 
'The common laws' protection for judges and 
prosecutors formed part of a 'cluster of 
immunities protecting the various participants 
in judge-supervised trials' which stemmed 
'from the characteristics of the judicial 
process' (citations omitted) ClNleither 
party, witness, counsel, jury or judge can be 
put to answer, civilly or . . . for words 
spoken in office . . . ' ) • 
Id. at 107. 
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The court recognized that a party who has been opposed 
in judicial proceedings may seek a new forum for continuing the 
controversy. The Supreme Court recognized that absolute immunity 
is necessary to protect witnesses, prosecutors and judges from 
such continuation of controversy. The court quoted Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 57 L.ed.2d 895 (1978) as follows: 
'Absolute immunity is thus necessary to assure 
that judges, advocates, and witnesses can 
perform their respective functions without 
harassment or intimidation.• Butz, supra, at 
512 . . . 
Id. at 108. 
In conclusion the Supreme Court held: "In short the 
common law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages 
liability for all persons - governmental or otherwise - who were 
integral parts of the judicial process." ^d. at 108. 
The court then indicated that remedies were available to 
deter persons from acting improperly as witnesses in criminal 
proceedings through the criminal process. Perjury is a crime in 
Utah. See UCA §§ 76-8-502, -503, -505. Criminal statutes 
exist in Utah to thwart even the pretrial giving of false 
information in aid of prosecution. See False Reports of Offenses 
to Law Enforcement Officer UCA § 76-8-506; and Tampering with 
Evidence, UCA § 76-8-510(2). Thus public policy and public 
methods exist for discouraging and thwarting the giving of 
improper information and testimony by witnesses. 
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The absolute immunity of witnesses applies whether or 
not a party is convicted. The Supreme Court rejected arguments 
that because the parties in certain cases are found innocent, 
they have thus proven that the testimony must be false and 
therefore a damage suit should be allowed by them even if not 
allowed by convicted persons: 
We rejected a similar contention ih Imbler 
(Imbler v. Pachtman, 24 U.S. at 425, 47 
L.ed.2d 128 [1983]). Petitioner contended 
that 'his suit should be allowed even if 
others would not be, because the district 
court's issuance of the writ of habeus corpus 
shows that his suit has substance.1 Id, at 42 8 
• . . We declined to carve out such an 
exception to prosecutorial immunity, noting 
that petitioner's success in a collateral 
proceeding did not necessarily establish the 
merits of his civil rights action. 
Id. at 113. 
The Supreme Court was concerned that even the processi 
of a civil case would be an extreme burden on witnesses. At 
note 29 at p. 112 the Court mentioned how lawsuits if allowed, 
may well be inappropriate for summary judgment because whether 
not the statement was true and whether or not it was done with 
malice would be a fact issue for the courts. Thus if absolute 
immunity were not granted, the defendants almost automatically 
would be subjected to discovery and trial. 
Extremely enlightening are the dissenting opinions in 
Briscoe, all of which assume that common law immunity 
applies to lay witnesses but do not think that common law 
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immunity should be extended to law enforcement officers in the 
civil rights context. 
Absolute immunity of persons intimately involved with 
the criminal process as informants and witnesses is essential to 
the protection of the judicial process. 
No state cases from any state of the United States were 
found which abbrogated the absolute immunity of lay witnesses. 
In summary, the absolute immunity of lay witnesses is 
essential to the protection of the judicial process. Lay 
witnesses should not be required either to defend or to be 
subjected to the possibility of damages. Even defending a civil 
suit could have a chilling effect on testimony and could disrupt 
the judicial process. No such lawsuit should be countenanced and 
witnesses should not be required to account, in a civil suit, for 
their information, testimony, thought processes, or actions with 
respect to criminal proceedings. Harassment by persons who are 
either convicted or who, by some quirk of jury fate were 
acquitted, should not be allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
Schettler's claims are misstated and unfounded without 
citation to the record so that verification of 
mischaracterizations could be made by the court. 
Schettler cites no dispute of facts which would make the 
grant of summary judgment inappropriate. 
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The grant of summary judgment was appropriate because 
Black and Guiver merely gave information to the prosecutor and 
testified. The prosecutor made an independent determination, 
without any undue influence, that Schettler should be prosecuted. 
Black & Guiver should not be subjected to a civil suit 
as a matter of law to protect the judicial process from the 
chilling effect of disgruntled criminal defendants filing suits 
against witnesses and informants. Appropriate procedures exist 
in the criminal law to deter improper information to law 
enforcement officers which fully satisfies the need to discourage 
improper information without allowing civil suits from 
disgruntled criminal defendants. 
DATED this /J^day of October, 1987. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Robert R. W a l l a c e ^ ~ 




RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
* * * 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim/ or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, 
mayf at any timer move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment 
in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. The motion 
shall be served at least 10 days before the 
time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party 
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damage. 
* * * 
(e) Form of affidavit; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred 
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavit or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
RULE 24, RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order here indicated: 
* * * 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement 
shall first indicate briefly the nature 
of the case, the course of proceedings, 
and its disposition in the court below. 
There shall follow a statement of facts 
relevant to the issues presented for 
review. All statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below shall 
be supported by citations to the record. 
(See Paragraph [e])^ 
• * * 
(e) References in brief to the record. References 
shall be made to the pages of the original 
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) . . 
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